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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on two-party conflicts that result in protracted and 
costly stalemates, a negative-sum situation often referred to in the game-
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theoretic literature as a “war of attrition.”1  Since such conflicts are 
counter-productive and collectively irrational, they pose a difficult puzzle.  
What is the underlying logic of these conflicts, why do such conflicts occur 
with such regularity in the real world, and what role can law play in these 
situations? 
This paper is divided into five parts.  Following this introduction, Part II 
provides some background and presents some real-world examples of 
costly and protracted wars of attrition.2  Part III examines one particular 
war of attrition—what I refer to as a “legislative war of attrition”—the 
current impasse over Puerto Rico’s constitutional status.3  Next, Part IV 
presents an idealized two-player war of attrition model as well as a more 
realistic n-player evolutionary model.4  Lastly, Part V concludes by 
identifying some areas for further research.5 
II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Competitive interactions often involve conflicting claims over scarce 
resources.  Examples range from the division of revenues among players 
and owners in sports leagues to disputes over land and water rights in the 
West Bank.  Competitive interactions also revolve around opposing 
preferences regarding public policy—such as Puerto Rico’s territorial 
status.  How are these conflicting claims or preferences to be decided or 
resolved? 
One solution method is “spontaneous order,” or the decentralized 
creation and evolution of self-enforcing norms and conventions.6  
However, the resulting norms and conventions may not be wealth-
maximizing or mutually-beneficial.  Furthermore, the conditions necessary 
for the creation and evolution of self-enforcing order may not be stable or 
present.7  Another solution method is centralized coercion.8  A coercive 
                                                          
 1. See JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 28-39 
(1982). 
 2. See infra Part II (introducing solution methods such as spontaneous order, 
coercion, and bargaining). 
 3. See infra Part III (reviewing the history of and logic behind the conflict over 
Puerto Rico’s status). 
 4. See infra Part IV (presenting mathematical models and hypothetical situations 
to exemplify the author’s war of attrition theory). 
 5. See infra Part V (summarizing and suggesting that slight alterations of the 
variables of the author’s war of attrition theory could lead to further productive 
research). 
 6. See Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1989).  See 
generally DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 36-42 (1969) 
(considering incidents of self-enforcing norms and conventions such as meeting in the 
same location every day). 
 7. See F.E. Guerra-Pujol, On the Origins of Property Rights 3-4 (Dec. 31, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (explaining why spontaneous-order 
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solution, however, presupposes the existence of an external Leviathan, a 
body strong enough to impose its will.  Regardless of whether a Leviathan 
truly exists, coercive solutions are often perceived as illegitimate or unfair 
by the losing side, leading to further conflict and unrest.9  Lastly, a more 
desirable method of resolving competing claims is through bargaining.10  In 
theory, negotiated solutions produce gains beneficial for both sides.11  In 
practice, however, bargaining might be unfeasible or unproductive for a 
wide variety of reasons, such as self-serving biases,12 high transaction 
costs,13 and the existence of “infeasible” or mutually-incompatible claims.14 
Consider, for example, the disastrous Major League Baseball strike/lock-
out of 1994-199515 and the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict over 
West Bank settlements.16  These types of negative-sum conflicts are not 
amenable to the classic solutions set forth above.  As a result, when 
conventions, external coercion, and bargaining are not practicable solutions 
or are unavailable, competitive interactions often lead to a costly and 
protracted stalemate among the competing sides.17 Other real-world 
                                                          
solutions are often unstable). 
 8. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 115-19 (A.R. Waller, ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651) (considering the rationale behind relinquishing 
power to a central authority). 
 9. See, e.g., EDWARD E. ZAJAC, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS 129-30 
(1995) (considering principles of fairness and how “fairness” factors into institutional 
change). 
 10. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 
(1960) 
 11. See id. (providing an example in which both parties were made better off from 
negotiation). 
 12. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: 
The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110 (1997) (arguing that 
negotiating parties tend to arrive at judgments that reflect their self-serving bias, 
significantly impeding settlement). 
 13. See Duncan Simester & Marc Knez, Direct and Indirect Bargaining Costs and 
the Scope of the Firm, 75 J. BUS. 283, 284, 303 (2002) (explaining the bargaining costs 
of negotiation, including documenting and enforcing an agreement, and that an option 
with a lower cost is often more desirable). 
 14. See Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl, Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with 
Infeasible Claims, 51 MGMT. SCI. 249 (2005) (recognizing that inconsistent feelings of 
entitlement among parties historically result in unsuccessful negotiations). 
 15. See, e.g., Paul D. Staudohar, The Baseball Strike of 1994-95, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV., Mar. 1997, at 21. (examining four areas that caused negotiations between 
baseball players and owners to fail and result in work stoppages: the allocation of 
revenues, cooperating for mutual gain, behavioral atmosphere during bargaining, and 
the accommodation of varying interests). 
 16. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Painful Mideast Truth: Force Trumps Diplomacy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009, at A4; Mark Landler & Ethan Bronner, Clinton Fails to 
Win Palestinian Assent to Israeli Plan for Slowing Settlement Building, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 2009, at A6 (suggesting that Middle East peace talks are proving unsuccessful 
due to various issues and barriers). 
 17. Another possible method of resolving competing claims is the use of a random 
device for assigning such claims.  See, e.g., Charles V. Bagli, Flipping a Coin, 
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examples of this phenomenon include civil actions and civil litigation.  
Although a large portion of civil actions are settled out of court,18 some 
civil actions resemble costly and protracted wars of attrition.  In those 
cases, litigants and their attorneys find themselves locked in a no-win 
situation where neither side is willing to compromise or back down.  
Therefore, both plaintiff and defendant end up investing significant 
resources in the contest, but their efforts cancel each other out, leading to a 
Pyrrhic victory or no victory at all.19 
The “war of attrition” concept, often referred to as the “Hawk-Dove 
Game,” has been extensively treated in the evolutionary biology 
literature.20  This paper presents a modified war of attrition model designed 
to capture the essential features of the myriad conflict situations described 
above.  Before presenting this model, I present a detailed discussion of one 
specific war of attrition for illustration. 
III. THE PUERTO RICAN STATUS DEBATE AS A “LEGISLATIVE WAR OF 
ATTRITION” 
The century-old debate over Puerto Rico’s constitutional status, the 
focus of this paper, provides another good illustration of a costly and 
protracted war of attrition.21  At present, Puerto Rico is a “commonwealth,” 
or territory of the United States.22  Most Puerto Ricans, however, are 
dissatisfied with their Island’s current political status and thus favor some 
form of change.  This begs the question: what type of change?  Indeed, this 
question is so important to Puerto Ricans that political parties and politics 
on the Island are not divided along the more familiar Democratic-
                                                          
Dividing an Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at BU1 (describing an alternative 
method of conflict resolution that essentially employs a random device―exemplifying 
what can occur when the traditional methods of resolution fail or are unavailable). 
 18. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related 
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) 
(noting that only 1.8% of federal civil cases are resolved in a trial). 
 19. See, e.g., JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 449-93 (1996) (detailing the 
problems presented by civil litigation in which both parties to the described toxic tort 
lawsuit were unsatisfied after their drawn-out and expensive trial). 
 20. See MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 1, at 10-20; D.T. Bishop & C. Cannings, A 
Generalized War of Attrition, 70 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 85, 88 (1978); J. Maynard 
Smith & G.R. Price, The Logic of Animal Conflict, 246 NATURE 15, 17 (1973) 
(providing examples and interpretations of the “war of attrition,” including 
mathematical models and hypothetical situations). 
 21. The author expresses no opinion as to whether the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico is an “incorporated” or “unincorporated” territory of the United States, since the 
precise territorial status of Puerto Rico is immaterial to the results of our model. 
 22. Compare Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 313 (1922) (holding that Puerto 
Rico is an unincorporated territory), with Consejo de Salud Playa de Ponce v. Rullan, 
586 F. Supp. 2d 22, 52 (D. P.R. 2008) (stating that Puerto Rico has since become an 
incorporated territory). 
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Republican lines, as in the mainland United States, but rather over each 
party’s preferred status solution.23 
Puerto Rico has two major political parties and one minor third party.  
One of the major political parties, the Popular Democratic Party (PDP), 
supports an improved or “enhanced” version of Puerto Rico’s current 
Commonwealth status, in which Puerto Rico would enjoy greater 
autonomy in certain policy areas, such as customs, shipping, and 
immigration policy.24  In the enhanced commonwealth proposal, Puerto 
Ricans would still enjoy American citizenship and the right to travel to the 
mainland United States.  The other major Puerto Rican political party, the 
New Progressive Party (NPP), supports “statehood” or annexation, with the 
goal of Puerto Rico becoming the fifty-first state of the Union.25  The 
Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP), a minor but influential party, 
supports independence or total separation from the United States.26 
At this time, Puerto Rico’s two main political parties, the PDP and NPP, 
have taken opposing sides on a bill that is pending before Congress, “The 
Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2009” (H.R. 2499).27  In summary, this bill 
would authorize “a federally-sanctioned self-determination process for the 
people of Puerto Rico.”28  Specifically, the bill calls for a two-stage 
referendum process, with an initial referendum at time T1 and a subsequent 
referendum at time T2.  The initial referendum at time T1 would propose the 
following two options: Option 1: “Puerto Rico should continue to have its 
present form of political status” (the status quo option), and Option 2: 
“Puerto Rico should have a different political status” (the change option).29 
In the event that a majority of the voters chose Option 1—the status quo 
option—an identical, repeat referendum would be held after eight years 
                                                          
 23. See generally ARTURO MORALES CARRIÓN, PUERTO RICO: A POLITICAL AND 
CULTURAL HISTORY (1983) (describing the centrality of the status issue in Puerto 
Rican politics). 
 24. See, e.g., Congressional Panel: Enhanced Commonwealth Not an Option, P.R. 
HERALD, Oct. 5, 2000, ¶¶ 4-5, http://www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/vol4n40/ 
NoEnhancedCommon-en.html [hereinafter Congressional Panel] (describing the 
PDP’s enhanced commonwealth proposal as including local ability to decide which 
U.S. federal laws to apply in Puerto Rico, among other components). 
 25. See F.E. Guerra-Pujol, Puerto Rico as a Critical Locality: Is a Post-Colonial 
Puerto Rico Possible? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Impasse over Puerto Rico’s 
Status, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 563 (2008)  (presenting NPP’s support for Puerto 
Rican statehood). 
 26. See id. at 562-66 (describing PIP’s support for independence and using the 
positions of the three major political parties to present a three-player or “true”  game 
model of the Puerto Rican status debate). 
 27. See H.R. 2499, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009)  (presenting the bill as a Puerto 
Rican referendum in which voters would choose to either continue Puerto Rico’s 
current status or to change that status in an undefined way). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. 
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with the same two options.  This process would continue ad infinitum every 
eight years until a majority of the voters eventually selected Option 2—the 
change option.  But once a simple majority of the voters agree to the 
change option, the bill then calls for a final referendum at time T2 in which 
the voters would choose among the following three non-territorial options: 
(1) independence, (2) statehood, or (3) “sovereignty in association with the 
United States.”30  One possible source of the PDP’s opposition to H.R. 
2499 is the language used to describe this third option, since it is unclear 
whether “sovereignty in association with the United States” is the same as 
the improved or enhanced commonwealth status supported by the PDP.31 
H.R. 2499, however, is simply the latest installment in a longstanding 
struggle between the PDP and NPP over Puerto Rico’s constitutional status.  
In summary, Puerto Rico’s main political parties have been engaged in a 
costly and protracted war of attrition over the Island’s future status, which I 
shall refer to as a “legislative war of attrition.”  Thus far, these myriad 
competing efforts appear to have cancelled each other out and produced the 
current impasse over Puerto Rico’s status.  Will the current effort to change 
Puerto Rico’s status, H.R. 2499, suffer a similar fate of impasse, deadlock, 
or stalemate? 
Next, I present a symmetrical war of attrition model.  My goal is not 
only to explain the ultimate source of the impasse over Puerto Rico’s 
constitutional status but also to understand the perverse underlying logic of 
costly and protracted wars of attrition generally. 
IV. A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO LEGISLATIVE WARS OF ATTRITION 
In this section, I discuss the utility of mathematical models in law and 
present a two-player war of attrition model along with an n-player 
evolutionary model. 
A.  A Few Words about the Utility of Models in Law 
Before proceeding, I wish to make a few points about the utility of 
game-theoretic models in law.  Most legal literature is based on purely 
verbal arguments.  However, the problem with purely verbal arguments is 
that they tend to be imprecise, fuzzy, and vague.32  The “looseness” of most 
                                                          
 30. See id. § 2(a)-(b). 
 31. Compare id. § 2(c)(2) (defining “sovereignty in association with the United 
States” as a “political association” between the same nations), with Congressional 
Panel, supra note 24, ¶¶ 4-5 (describing the enhanced commonwealth proposal, which 
includes a permanent connection to the United States, citizenship for Puerto Ricans, 
U.S. government benefits without taxes, and the Puerto Rican government’s ability to 
choose which U.S. laws it wants to apply). 
 32. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE 
CONSTITUTION 73-80 (1991) (discussing the “level of generality” problem―the way 
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verbal arguments leads to confusion and unproductive squabbling among 
scholars, who end up arguing back-and-forth for years about the meaning 
and implications of their verbal models. 
Of course, I recognize at the outset that game-theoretic models and 
mathematical models are generally much simpler than the real-world 
scenarios they are designed to depict.  For example, the models in this 
paper are highly stylized and based on a finite set of simplifying 
assumptions, such as symmetrical payoffs and a well-defined strategy set 
consisting of only two choices.  In addition, I ignore the psychology of 
sunk costs, the problem of stochastic effects (such as random shocks), and 
the possibility of altruism or “other-regarding” behavior. Nevertheless, 
what models sacrifice in specificity and detail, they gain in tractability and 
clarity.  In the words of two contemporary game theorists, “models are 
simple maps for understanding the consequences of a small number of key 
assumptions.”33  In addition, formal models may help to uncover the 
underlying logic or unifying structure of seemingly unrelated situations.  
Then, and only then, after stating the operating assumptions of these 
models up front, do I attempt to explain the results of these models in 
words. 
B.  A Two-Player War of Attrition Model 
This two-player war of attrition model consists of a one-shot, 
simultaneous-move game in which the players, designated as Player A and 
Player B, support opposing positions on a given issue or public policy 
debate.  I begin with this simple scenario first for ease of exposition.  Later 
in this subsection, I consider an infinite version of the game. 
In addition, I make the following set of assumptions: each player prefers 
that his policy position prevails and obtains the positive payoff (v) if his 
position indeed prevails.  For simplicity, I assume that the intensity of each 
player’s preferences are equal.  That is, I assume that the value of v is 
fixed.  Also, the players must simultaneously choose between one of two 
possible strategies at the outset of the game: hawk or dove.  The hawk 
strategy is the equivalent of fighting, and there is no bluffing in this game; 
the player who fights always pays a cost (c) to obtain his or her desired 
policy goal.  The dove strategy, in contrast, consists of backing down or 
retreating.  By choosing to back down, the player does not pay the cost of 
fighting.  Unlike some hawk-dove models in the previous literature, in this 
                                                          
the Supreme Court determines how generally constitutional rights are meant to be 
interpreted). 
 33. RICHARD MCELREATH & ROBERT BOYD, MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF 
SOCIAL EVOLUTION 4-6 (2007). 
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model there are no display costs.34  Lastly, I assume that the benefit or 
value of prevailing (v) is always larger than the cost of fighting (c), so v is 
greater than c.  The intuition behind this assumption is that the players are 
unlikely to fight when the cost of fighting outweighs the utility of 
prevailing or the value of the contested resource, as the case may be. 
Notice that I specify the respective benefits and costs corresponding with 
each strategy in abstract terms (the parameters v and c) rather than 
expressing them in terms of numerical values (such as 1, 2, and 3) in order 
to illustrate the underlying logic and structure of seemingly unrelated 
problems.  In addition, another advantage of expressing these values as 
abstract parameters is flexibility and generality; that is, this abstract model 
permits me to derive results for any value that these parameters might 
actually take.35 
Since this is a game-theoretic or interactive model, the payoffs depend 
on the strategies simultaneously chosen by the players at the start of play.  
The structure of the game and the payoffs can be expressed in “extended 
form” (see Figure 1a) as follows: 
                                                          
 34. In some models, doves pay a display cost when they pretend to adopt the hawk 
strategy for some time period t before deciding to back down.  See generally 
MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 1, at 149 (evaluating the success and long-term indicator 
of displays). 
 35. See MCELREATH & BOYD, supra note 33, at 4-6 (explaining that game theory 
models are deliberately general in order to eliminate variables that are irrelevant to a 
given study and allow researchers to understand complex phenomena at a micro level, 
one detail at a time). 
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Figure   1a 
 
Extended form (game tree) symmetrical war of attrition 
game with two players and two strategies 
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The payoffs can also be expressed in “normal form” (see Figure 1b) as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, there are four possible interactions in the one-shot game: 
(1) hawk-dove, (2) dove-hawk, (3) dove-dove, and (4) hawk-hawk, 
resulting in four possible payoff combinations.  For instance, if Player A 
chooses hawk and Player B chooses dove, then Player A receives a positive 
payoff minus the cost of fighting (v – c), while Player B obtains no 
payoff.36  This result occurs because Player A is more likely to obtain his 
desired policy change if the other player does not fight back, though Player 
A still ends up paying the cost of fighting.  Likewise, if Player A chooses 
dove while Player B chooses hawk, the payoffs are reversed: Player A gets 
nothing while Player B gets v – c. 
In the event of a dove-dove interaction in which both players choose to 
back down instead of fighting, neither prevails or obtains his preferred 
                                                          
 36. The payoff to the dove player in this scenario might, in fact, be negative.  My 
student, Nadine Sfeir, has pointed out to me that although such a player avoids the cost 
of fighting, his choice of the dove strategy might generate a reputation for backing 
down and weaken his ability to fight in future rounds.  Nevertheless, since this model 
consists of a single, one-round game, I ignore reputation costs and the like for 
simplicity. 
 
 
Player B 
chooses hawk 
Player B 
chooses dove 
Player A 
chooses hawk 
,  , 0 
Player A 
chooses dove 
0,    0, 0 
 
Figure 1b 
 
Normal form payoff table of symmetrical war of attrition 
game with two players and two strategies 
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policy outcome and both players receive a zero payoff.  The reason for a 
zero payoff (instead of v/2 as in the classic hawk-dove game) is that in this 
model, both players prefer change to retaining the status quo, but when 
both players back down, the status quo is preserved by default.37  Lastly, if 
both players choose to fight, resulting in a hawk-hawk interaction, then 
both players end up paying the cost of fighting (c) and neither prevails 
because, by fighting, their efforts cancel each other out, leading to a 
preservation of the status quo, a state of affairs that neither player prefers. 
At this point, it is worth noting that one aspect of this war of attrition 
model shares some similarities with a model often referred to as the “Game 
of Chicken.”38  In the Game of Chicken, there are two players driving race 
cars towards each other at high speeds on a one lane road.  Like the binary 
strategy set forth in this model, the strategy set of the drivers in the Game 
of Chicken consists of two choices: swerve or drive straight.  If both 
players drive straight, there will be a serious collision and thus a cost will 
be imposed on both drivers.  Similarly, if the players in the war of attrition 
model both fight, they both pay the cost of fighting. 
Nevertheless, this model differs from the Game of Chicken in two 
important dimensions.  One difference is the treatment of cooperative 
interactions, the “swerve-swerve” and “dove-dove” interactions.  In the war 
of attrition model, dove-dove interactions produce a zero payoff for both 
players since both avoid the cost of fighting and since neither is able to 
impose his desired outcome on the other player.  In the Game of Chicken, 
however, swerve-swerve interactions produce a small positive payoff for 
both players because both drivers avoid being the sole “chicken.” 
Another difference between this model and the Game of Chicken is the 
treatment of mixed-type interactions, such as “swerve-drive straight” and 
“dove-hawk” interactions.  In this model, when a dove interacts with a 
hawk, the dove’s payoff is zero.  He avoids the cost of fighting, and the 
other player’s win does not impose a cost on the dove.  In contrast, the 
worst possible outcome in the Game of Chicken is to swerve if the player is 
going to drive straight.  The player that swerves not only obtains a negative 
payoff (since he has lost the contest), but also this negative payoff is 
greater than the negative payoff generated when both players drive straight.  
The logic of this result is that the driver that swerves is the sole “chicken.”  
That is, although a head-on collision produces a negative payoff, neither 
player can be called a “chicken,” an epithet deemed worse than the cost of 
                                                          
 37. As my colleague Carlos del Valle has pointed out to me, a dove-dove 
interaction might produce a positive payoff, a “peace dividend.”  However, analysis of 
this type of payoff is outside the scope of our current inquiry. 
 38. See, e.g., WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 197-201 (1993). 
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a head-on collision.39 
Before proceeding, it is also worth taking a moment to describe the 
salient differences between the hawk-dove model presented in this paper 
and the traditional or classical hawk-dove model that appears in the game 
theory literature.40  For reference, I shall refer to the traditional hawk-dove 
model as the “Maynard Smith model” to contrast it with the model 
presented in this paper, which I shall refer to as the modified war of 
attrition model, which differs from the Maynard Smith model in the 
following dimensions: 
1. Biological versus social science approach 
The focus of the classical Maynard Smith model is animal conflict.41  
Specifically, the Maynard Smith model is designed to explain the 
prevalence of “display” behavior in nature in which many species of 
animals settle contests without resort to actual fighting.  The focus of my 
model, in contrast, is on actual human conflict, such as conflicts over 
public policy or scarce resources, and not on mere display behavior.42 
2. Dove-dove interactions 
Dove-dove interactions in the Maynard Smith model produce a payoff of 
v/2 for both players because the players are assumed to share the resource 
or, in the alternative, because the winner of the contest is selected at 
random, so that each player wins half of the time.43  In my model, by 
contrast, I assume more realistically that when both players choose to back 
                                                          
 39. The Game of Chicken thus raises an intriguing possibility: under what 
conditions might the dove strategy in our model generate a negative payoff?  For 
example, there might be a cost to backing down (choosing dove) when the other player 
chooses hawk, such as a reputation cost.  In addition, backing down at time T1 might 
affect the outcome of a future contest at time T2.  That is, one’s choice of strategy may 
have a “path-dependent effect.”  In the standard war of attritions model in the existing 
literature, the outcome of hawk-hawk and dove-dove interactions are completely 
random.  See, e.g., MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 1, at 12-13.  However, one could 
imagine a more complex or dynamic model in which the choice of strategy during one 
round of play increases or decreases the distribution of payoffs in future rounds of the 
game. The intuition behind this idea is as follows: if A plays hawk and B plays dove 
during the first round of play, A not only wins the first round, A is also in a better 
position to win future rounds of play even if B later switches to hawk.  Nevertheless, 
we ignore this possibility in our model for the sake of simplicity. 
 40. See generally MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 1, at 11-20 (detailing the numerous 
variables that are considered in the traditional model). 
 41. See id. at 10-12 (noting that the use of the word “strategy” in describing game 
theory is derived from animal behavior, specifically when animals compete over 
resources). 
 42. See infra Part IV.C (developing an evolutionary or biological model). 
 43. See MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 1, at 13 (rationalizing that if the resource 
cannot be shared, the cost is minimal since in the dove-dove interaction, the contestants 
are more prone to “display” and thus not injure each other). 
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down, neither player wins the contest, leading to a zero payoff (instead of 
v/2) for both players. 
3. Hawk-hawk interactions 
Lastly, in the Maynard Smith model the outcome of a hawk-hawk 
interaction is determined at random, leading to a payoff of  (v – c)/2, 
because the players are assumed to be equally-matched.44  My model 
likewise assumes that the players are equally matched, but I reach a 
fundamentally different conclusion from this baseline assumption.  I 
conclude that neither player wins the contest, leading to a negative payoff 
of  – c instead of  (v – c)/2 for both players, since their efforts are likely to 
cancel each other out, producing a costly war of attrition and preserving the 
status quo. 
This approach to hawk-hawk interactions provides the key to 
understanding the inherently negative-sum nature of costly and protracted 
wars of attrition: when both sides choose to fight, neither side wins because 
a hawk-hawk interaction increases the likelihood of stalemate. Why?  
When both sides expend resources fighting for their respective policy 
outcomes, their efforts cancel each other out, leading to a costly war of 
attrition with no change in the status quo.  Consider once again the Puerto 
Rican status debate and other examples set forth in Part II of this paper: the 
Major League Baseball strike of 1994-199545 and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict over West Bank settlements.46  Both sides in these myriad conflicts 
prefer to see their respective positions prevail, but by refusing to negotiate 
or surrender to the demands of other side, the warring factions end up 
perpetuating a negative-sum conflict in which all sides are worse off. 
Nevertheless, despite these differences, my modified model shares the 
same underlying logic and structure of the Maynard Smith model: in both 
models, the individual players are competing against each other, they are 
acting as proxies for strategies (either hawk or dove), and their strategies 
are set at the start of the game.  Also, in both models the hawk strategy 
(fighting) can be compared to defection, while dove (backing down) is 
more akin to cooperation.  That is, if both players choose to back down, 
then neither gets its preferred outcome, but neither pays the cost of fighting 
either, perhaps allowing time for a mutually-beneficial compromise 
                                                          
 44. See id. at 12-13 (reasoning that each hawk contestant has a 50% chance of 
injuring the other contestant and winning the resource, and also a 50% chance of being 
injured by the other contestant and losing the resource). 
 45. See Staudohar, supra note 15, at 26 (documenting the losses that both Major 
League Baseball players and owners suffered during the strike). 
 46. See Bronner, supra note 16 (discussing the costs borne by both Israelis and 
Palestinians as a result of barriers, checkpoints, and other security procedures in place 
to prevent military escalation). 
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solution or a negotiated settlement.  If both choose to fight, however, 
neither obtains its preferred outcome, yet both end up paying the cost of 
fighting. 
Having compared and contrasted the classical Maynard Smith hawk-
dove model with my modified war of attrition model, I now proceed to find 
the existence of Nash Equilibria47 in the modified model.  That is, what is 
the likely outcome of this revised hawk-dove game? 
In summary, there are two pure-strategy equilibria in the modified one-
shot game.  This conclusion becomes apparent once one evaluates each 
player’s best response to the other.  Given the payoff structure of this 
modified hawk-dove model (as set forth in Figures 1a and 1b above), hawk 
is the best response to dove because v – c is greater than 0, while dove is 
the best response to hawk because 0 is greater than c.  That is, Player A 
prefers to fight if Player B is going to back down, and vice-versa, Player B 
prefers to back down if Player A is going to fight.  Nevertheless, this is not 
the outcome one observes in the war of attrition scenarios described in 
Parts II and III above.48  In the absence of conventions, external coercion, 
or bargaining, one observes that a conflict often escalates into a costly and 
protracted war of attrition.  How can one explain the persistence of such 
wars of attrition (hawk-hawk interactions), in so many myriad types of 
conflict scenarios? 
One source of this incongruity is the simultaneous-move nature of the 
modified hawk-dove game.  Being a simultaneous-move game, neither 
player can observe the other player’s move ahead of time, so the players 
could end up choosing the same strategies (hawk-hawk or dove-dove), 
leading to sub-optimal payoffs for both players.  For example, both players 
might be committed ex ante to fighting—hoping in vain that the other 
player has chosen to back down—leading to a costly and pointless war of 
attrition in which both players end up fighting. 
Another source of negative-sum hawk-hawk interactions is the 
possibility of mixed strategies.  In place of a single, pure strategy (hawk or 
dove), the players might select a probabilistic mix of hawk-dove 
combinations, playing the hawk strategy, for example, with probability p 
and choosing dove with probability 1 – p.  Once I introduce the possibility 
of mixed strategies, one can easily determine the probability of a hawk-
hawk interaction, that is, the probability that the game will turn into a war 
                                                          
 47. See Guilherme Carmona, Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity 
in Large Games, 11 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 10, 12 (2009) (defining a Nash Equilibrium 
as one in which all players choose the optimal strategy for themselves, while taking 
into account the actions of the other players, and each player cannot be better off by 
changing his strategy if the other players do not change theirs); see also John Nash, The 
Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950). 
 48. Supra Parts II & III. 
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of attrition. 
Consider an infinite version of this two-player hawk-dove war of 
attrition game.  That is, instead of a one-shot or single-round game, I now 
imagine a potentially never-ending game consisting of an infinite or 
endless number of rounds.  For example, returning to some of the conflict 
scenarios set forth in Part II, one could model the long-standing debates 
over Puerto Rican status or the Middle East conflict as an endless hawk-
dove game.  Indeed, this idea is explicit in H.R. 2499, which proposes a 
potentially never-ending series of referenda if a majority of the voters fail 
to approve Option 2, the option to change Puerto Rico’s status.49  In 
summary, the payoff structure of the infinite game is identical to that of the 
one-shot game, since each individual round of the infinite game provides 
the same payoffs to the players as the one-shot game does.  Furthermore, I 
assume the players avoid the “sunk cost fallacy” and ignore their previous 
payoffs (i.e., accumulated losses and wins during the previous rounds of 
play) because such previous payoffs are, in essence, sunk costs and thus 
have no bearing on the current round being played.  The sunk cost fallacy 
assumes that a player considers their past decisions, and that their prior 
investment in fighting commits them to future investment.  In ignoring 
sunk costs, I assume that the players act rationally and consider instead 
their expected or future payoffs in deciding his optimal strategy and thus in 
deciding whether to continue playing at all.50  Later, in Part IV.C below, I 
relax this rationality assumption.Before proceeding, it is worth noting that 
the infinite version of the game will end only when one or both of the 
players decide to stop playing the game, either because one of the players 
has accumulated too many losses during the course of the game, leading to 
his voluntary surrender, or because both players are able to opt-out of the 
game altogether through a negotiated settlement or compromise solution.  
In this model, however, I assume that the players have an unlimited amount 
of resources to fight and that negotiations are not feasible. 
What is the optimal strategy in the infinite game?  Since neither player 
knows with certainty the strategy of the other player, the optimal approach 
might consist of a mixed strategy in which a player is indifferent to playing 
either hawk or dove.  Consider Player A, although my analysis applies 
equally to both Players A and Player B since the payoffs in this model are 
                                                          
 49. See supra notes 27-31; see also H.R. Res. 2499 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (as 
reported by H. Comm. on Natural Res., Oct. 8, 2009) (declaring that if Option 1 is 
selected, Puerto Rico will only be able to reassess their status every eight years, 
whereas Option 2 lists three choices which would allow Puerto Rico to reach a final 
resolution on this ongoing debate). 
 50. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 150 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1989) (1976) (analogizing situations where investors opt to cut their losses and 
abandon currently unproductive projects regardless of how much they have already 
invested to courtship rituals between males and coy females). 
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symmetrical for both players.  Here, I introduce the related ideas of 
expected payoff and probability.  That is, Player A’s expected payoff from 
playing a given strategy (say, hawk) depends on the probability (p) that 
Player B might also play hawk as well as the probability (1 – p) that Player 
B might choose dove. 
Thus, if Player A chooses hawk, Player A will pay a cost –c with 
probability p and will obtain the payoff v – c with probability 1 – p.  Recall 
that p is the probability that Player B also plays hawk, while 1 – p is the 
probability that Player B plays dove.  Accordingly, the expected payoff (V) 
to Player A of playing hawk [V(H)] can thus be expressed mathematically 
as follows:51 
 
V(H) = (–c)(p) + (v – c)(1 – p)                                                            (1.1) 
 
Likewise, Player A’s expected payoff from choosing the dove strategy 
[V(D)] can be expressed in the following form: 
 
V(D) = (0)(p) + (0)(1 – p) 
V(D) = 0                                                                                               (1.2) 
 
That is, if Player A chooses dove, then Player A receives a zero payoff 
because, regardless of the other player’s strategy, the dove strategy always 
produces a zero payoff against both hawk and dove, given my initial 
assumptions. 
Lastly, I determine Player A’s optimal mixed strategy [V’(A)] by setting 
equations 1.1 and 1.2 equal to each other, substituting  p’ for p, and solving 
for p’ as follows: 
 
(–c)(p’) + (v – c)(1 – p’) = 0 
–cp’ + v – c – vp’ + cp’ = 0 
v – c – vp’ = 0 
vp’ = v – c 
p’ = (v – c)/v =  V’(A) =  V’(B)                                                            (1.3) 
 
In other words, Player A’s optimal mixed strategy is to play hawk with a 
probability equal to (v – c)/v and dove with probability 1 – (v – c)/v.  Notice 
that the optimal mixed strategy is actually the same for both players since 
the payoffs in this modified model are symmetrical. 
Assuming v is greater than c, each player’s optimal strategy in the 
                                                          
 51. I present the complete details of our algebraic analysis so that the careful reader 
can follow each step of our analysis. 
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infinite game is to play hawk (fight) with a probability equal to the ratio 
that appears on the right-hand side of the above equation.  This ratio is a 
function of the stakes of the contest (v) and the cost of fighting (c) and 
increases as the numerical value of v increases and decreases as the value 
of c increases.  Thus, when v > c, there is a proportional relationship 
between the variables p’ and v but an inverse relationship between p’ and c. 
Having determined the probability that either player will play hawk 
(equation 1.3 above), I will now find the probability that any given round 
of play will result in a hawk-hawk interaction, that is, the probability that 
both players will simultaneously play hawk in round n of play, where n is 
any individual round of play.  In summary, since both players will choose 
the hawk strategy with probability p’ due to the symmetrical payoff 
structure of the game, the probability that both players play hawk on any 
given round of play is simply p’ × p’, or p’2. Similarly, the probability that 
hawk-hawk interactions occur on two consecutive rounds of play is p’2 × 
p’2, or p’4.Since the value of p’ (and thus the value of p’2) is a function of 
the stakes of the contest (v) and the cost of fighting (c), my modified hawk-
dove model conveys a valuable insight about real-world symmetrical wars 
of attrition.  In essence, the lesson is this: the larger the stakes of the 
conflict (the higher v is), the larger the probability of fighting.  By the same 
token, the larger the cost of fighting (the higher c is), the smaller the 
probability of fighting.  Thus far, I have presented a two-player war of 
attrition model.  In the next subsection, I consider a more realistic n-player 
evolutionary model. 
C.  An n-Player Evolutionary War of Attrition Model 
In place of the two-player model above, I now consider an n- or multi-
player modified hawk-dove model.  The n-player model operates on the 
following assumptions: the population consists of a large number of 
individuals; during each round of play, two individuals selected at random 
from the population meet and engage in a micro-conflict; and as before, 
there are only two possible strategies or types of individuals: hawk and 
dove.  Lastly, I further assume that these strategies are transmitted through 
an asexual inheritance mechanism: the victor of each two-pair, micro-
conflict not only survives but also produces a descendant-clone who 
asexually inherits the victor’s strategy; the loser, in contrast, is eliminated 
from the population.  If the conflict ends in a draw or tie, both contestants 
survive but neither produces a descendant. 
Given these assumptions, which strategy will be favored by natural 
selection?  To answer this question, I proceed in two stages.  First, I restate 
the payoff (V) corresponding to each possible interaction.  Since the 
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payoffs are the same as before,52 and since there are four possible micro-
interactions in all (hawk-hawk, hawk-dove, dove-hawk, and dove-dove), 
the payoffs corresponding to each interaction can be written as follows: 
 
V(H│H)  =  –c (the payoff to a hawk, given that it interacts with another  
 hawk) 
V(H│D)  =  v – c   (the payoff to a hawk, given that it interacts with a               
     dove) 
V(D│H)  =  0  (the payoff to a dove, given that it interacts with a hawk) 
V(D│D)  =  0  (the payoff to a dove, given that it interacts with another  
 dove) 
 
On the left-hand side, I have written the payoffs corresponding to each 
interaction in mathematical form, and on the right-hand side, I have 
“translated” the mathematical notation into plain English for the non-
mathematical reader.  Notice too that, because of the symmetrical nature of 
this model, for simplicity I state the payoffs of the row player only (Player 
A).  In a population model, the fitness of a given strategy is said to be 
“frequency dependent” because the success or fitness of a strategy depends 
not only on the frequency of the other strategy but also on that strategy’s 
own frequency.53  When fitness (rate of survival) is frequency dependent, 
evolutionary game theory helps one to determine which strategies are 
“evolutionarily stable strategies” and thus to find the long-run evolutionary 
equilibrium of the population—that is, the frequency of hawks and doves 
over many generations.  Specifically, I wish to answer the following two 
questions: 
(1) Is either the hawk or dove strategy able to resist invasion by the other 
strategy? 
(2) If no strategy is evolutionarily stable (i.e. able to resist invasion by 
the other strategy), is there an evolutionarily stable mix of strategies? 
Let p be the frequency of hawks in the population and 1 – p the 
frequency of doves in the population.  First, consider a population in which 
the frequency of hawks is very high (p ≈ 1). Under this scenario, hawks 
rarely interact with doves because the frequency of doves is very low (1 – p 
≈ 0), and thus the expected or average payoff (W) when the player acts as a 
hawk (H) is determined by her interactions with other hawks as follows: 
 
W(H) = w’ + (1)[ V (H│H)]  + (1 – 1)[ V (H│D)] 
                                                          
 52. Cf. Figure 1b, supra Part IV:B. 
 53. See MCELREATH & BOYD, supra note 33, at 38 (citing the significance of 
evolutionary game theory in determining when it best pays an individual to fight or flee 
based on the actions of the individual’s opponent). 
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W(H) = w’ +  V (H│H) 
W(H) = w’ – c 
 
Note that the parameter w’ in this equation refers to the “baseline 
fitness” of all the individuals in the population—that is, the probability of 
survival from generation to generation—and thus reflects the strength of 
selection on a given population.54  For convenience, I assume that w’ is 
larger than c, the cost of fighting. 
Now, consider the possibility of a rare dove-like mutant.  What would 
happen if a hawk were to interact with this rare dove mutant?  Will the 
dove strategy begin to spread across the population, gradually displacing 
the hawks, or will the hawk strategy be able to resist invasion? To answer 
this question, I determine the average fitness of the rare dove mutants 
among the population of hawks.  Since doves are rare (1 – p ≈ 0), the 
chance one dove will meet another dove is likewise small.  As a result, the 
average fitness of a rare dove [W(D)] is determined by his interaction with 
hawks as follows: 
 
W(D) = w’ +  V (D│H) 
W(D) = w’ + 0 
W(D) = w’ 
 
Notice, then, that in a population of hawks, the rare doves will on 
average outperform the hawks because W(D) is larger than W(H).  In other 
words, doves will invade the population and displace hawks because the 
average fitness of each dove (w’) is on average higher than the average 
fitness of each hawk (w’ – c).  Hawks will not be able to resist an invasion 
of doves.  But can a population of doves resist an invasion of hawks? 
Consider next a population in which the frequency of doves is very high 
(1 – p ≈ 1).  Since doves rarely interact with hawks when the frequency of 
hawks is low (p ≈ 0), the average fitness of a dove [W(D)] is determined by 
her interactions with other doves as follows: 
 
W(D) = w’ + (1)[ V(D│D)]  + (1 – 1)[ V(D│H)] 
W(D) = w’ +  V(D│D) 
W(D) = w’ + 0 
W(D) = w’ 
 
What would happen if a rare hawk-like mutant were to appear on the 
                                                          
 54. See id. at 40-41 (noting that when the baseline fitness is large in comparison to 
the effect of the behavior in question, gene frequencies change more slowly than if the 
baseline fitness is small). 
19
Guerra-Pujol: Insiders Versus Outsiders: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Puert
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2010
GUERRA-PUJOL 6/20/10 11/9/2010  7:20:41 PM 
644 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 18:3 
scene?  Since hawks are rare (p ≈ 0), the hawk mutant will interact mostly 
with the doves and her average fitness [W(H)] is thus as follows: 
 
W(H) = w’ +  V(H│D) 
W(H) = w’ + v – c 
 
Thus, in a population of doves, the rare hawks will on average do better 
than the doves because W(H) is larger than W(D) when the baseline fitness 
is larger than the cost of fighting.  Just as doves will invade a population of 
hawks, in this case hawks will invade a population of doves and eventually 
displace the doves because the average fitness of each hawk (w’ + v – c) is 
on average higher than the average fitness of each dove (w’) when v is 
greater than c.  Accordingly, these results suggest that neither hawk nor 
dove is an evolutionarily stable strategy because neither strategy is able to 
resist invasion by the other.  But is there some stable mix of hawks and 
doves?  And if so, what is it?  That is, in the long-run, what proportion of 
the population will be hawks, and what proportion will be doves? 
To find this mixed or “polymorphic” population equilibrium, one must 
first determine the expected or average payoff (W) corresponding to each 
strategy across a large number of interactions.  Since the expected payoffs 
depend on the overall frequency or proportion of hawks and doves in the 
population, again let p be the frequency of hawks in the population and 1– 
p the frequency of doves in the population.  Then, assuming that 
individuals interact at random, I obtain the expected fitness of a hawk as 
follows: 
 
W(H) = w’ + (p)[ V(H│H)]  + (1 – p)[ V(H│D)] 
W(H) = w’ + (p)(–c) + (1 – p)(v – c) 
W(H) = w’ – pc + v – c – pv + pc 
W(H) = w’ + v – c – pv                                                                        (2.1) 
 
Similarly, I obtain the expected fitness of a dove [W(D)] as follows (and, 
again, recall that the parameter w’ is the average fitness or baseline fitness 
of all individuals in the population): 
 
W(D) = w’ + (p)[V(D│H)]  + (1 – p)[V(D│D)] 
W(D) = w’ + (p)(0) + (1 – p)(0) 
W(D) = w’ + 0 + 0 
W(D) = w’                                                                                            (2.2) 
 
Having determined the expected fitness of hawks and doves, I next 
proceed to find the frequency at which there is an evolutionarily stable mix 
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of hawks and doves in the population by setting p = p’ and W(D) = W(H) 
and solving for p’ as follows: 
 
W(D) = W(H) 
w’ = w’ + v – c – p’v 
p’v = v – c 
p’ = (v – c)/v                                                                                        (2.3) 
 
Notice the striking parallel between the results of this evolutionary 
population model and results of the standard two-player game-theoretic 
model in the previous subsection of this paper.  Specifically, under the 
standard model an individual player’s optimal mixed strategy is to play 
hawk with a probability equal to (v – c)/v.55  Similarly, the equivalent 
evolutionary model demonstrates that the evolutionarily stable proportion 
of hawks in a large population is also equal to the same ratio: (v – c)/v. 
In addition, like my previous model, the evolutionary model produces 
two qualitatively different outcomes depending on the ratio of v to c.  
When the value of the resource exceeds the cost of fighting (v > c), hawks 
will displace doves from the population, and the larger v is in relation to c, 
the greater the proportion of the population will consist of hawks.  But 
when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the contested resource (v < 
c), then doves will outperform hawks, and the larger c is in relation to v, the 
greater the proportion of doves will be.  In both cases, the population will 
consist of a mix of doves and hawks, with the actual proportion of this mix 
depending on the magnitudes of v and c. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I conclude this paper by identifying the following three questions as 
fruitful areas for future research: 
(1) What happens when the payoffs are asymmetrical instead of 
symmetrical? 
In this paper, I have assumed for the sake of simplicity that the cost of 
fighting (c) and the stakes of the contest (v) are symmetrical for the players.  
In reality, however, although both players might prefer some form of 
change to the status quo, they will often disagree on the extent of the 
desired change.  One player might prefer a radical or “hard” change to the 
status quo (the “hard player”), while the other player might prefer a small 
or “soft” change (the “soft player”).  In other words, the stakes of the 
conflict and thus the cost of fighting might be asymmetrical for the 
                                                          
 55. Cf. Equation 1.3, supra Part IV.B. 
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players.56 
(2) What happens if the values of the parameters v and c change over 
time? 
Another interesting question for future research is to consider the 
possibility that v and c might not be fixed but might change over time.  
That is, the payoffs might be dynamic instead of static.  For example, the 
value of the contested resource might grow with time.  By the same token, 
the cost of fighting might vary over time as tactics and technology change.  
Thus, one could build a model in which either v or c (or both) change by 
some constant k.  This constant might be fixed in which v increases by 
some factor k’ during each round of play, or it might be probabilistic, 
varying from 0 to 1 according to some random mechanism. 
(3) Is there a link between payoffs in a given round and the outcome of 
future rounds? 
Lastly, another interesting idea for future work is the possibility of the 
players becoming stronger or weaker over time, i.e., during successive 
rounds of play.  One could imagine a model in which previous gains 
increase the probability of future gains—and in which losses during 
previous rounds of play increase the probability of future losses.  The 
intuition here is that one’s previous choices will not only have an effect on 
one’s future choices, but will also affect the likely outcome of the future 
rounds of the game.  For example, instead of the outcome of a hawk-hawk 
interaction or dove-dove interaction being decided randomly, as in the 
Maynard Smith model, the outcome of such interactions might be based on 
the relative strength of each player, which in turn would depend on the 
outcome of previous rounds of play. 
Also, in this paper I do not consider the accumulated payoffs (both losses 
and gains) from previous rounds of play, since such payoffs are, in effect, 
sunk costs.  But in real life, the outcomes of previous rounds of play do 
have an effect on the psychology of the players. Moreover, once one 
assumes that the resources available to the players are scarce or subject to 
some upper limit and that the selection and implementation of a strategy is 
not costless,57 then it becomes imperative to keep track of losses and gains 
                                                          
 56. For example, returning to H.R. 2499, the debate over Puerto Rico’s 
constitutional status is, in essence, a strategic contest between hard and soft players in 
which the existing Commonwealth status serves as the status quo position.  The NPP 
and the PIP support the statehood and independence options, respectively.  Both 
options constitute hard changes to the status quo. The PDP, in contrast, prefers an 
“enhanced” or improved Commonwealth, a softer or more incremental change.  But 
many members of the PDP as well as the PIP prefer the status quo to statehood; that is, 
they perceive the Commonwealth status as a “lesser evil” than statehood.  See supra 
notes 24-26. 
 57. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-91 
(1937) (surmising that if there were no limits, the situation would be analogous to 
voluntary slavery). 
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during the rounds of play. 
One possibility for doing this might be to present the model in visual 
form.  For example, whether the players are contesting rights to land, 
access to water, or shares of revenue, the sum value of the contested 
resource (land, water, revenue) might be presented visually in the form of a 
circle.  This circle, in turn, would consist of two colors, such a blue and 
green, with blue representing one player’s share of the contested resource 
and green representing the other player’s share.  The idea here is to present 
visually the changes over time to each player’s share of the contested 
resource during successive rounds of play. 
 
* *     * 
 
Summing up, competing interactions over scarce resources or over the 
content of public policy can result in radically different outcomes.  
Consistent with Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” metaphor of markets, some 
interactions might lead to a positive-sum equilibrium in which everyone 
benefits from mutual cooperation.58  Other interactions, in contrast, might 
produce a negative-sum Hobbesian equilibrium in which everyone is worse 
off because of mutual defection.59  For example, when conventions, 
coercion, and bargaining are not available for achieving a positive-sum 
outcome, a competitive interaction might result in a costly and protracted 
war of attrition. 
Furthermore, negative-sum wars of attrition abound in the real world.  
Consider, once again, the centennial debate over Puerto Rico’s 
constitutional status, the stand-off between the player’s union and baseball 
club owners during the Major League Baseball strike/lock-out of 1994-
1995, and the long-standing conflict between Israel and Palestine over 
disputed water rights and the construction of Jewish settlements in the West 
Bank.  In all these conflicts, the contending parties are locked in a costly 
and protracted negative-sum war of attrition. 
In this paper, I have attempted to determine the conditions under which a 
hawk-hawk interaction or costly war of attrition is most likely to occur, and 
I have shown that when the payoffs are symmetrical and bluffing is not 
permitted, the probability of a player choosing the hawk strategy (or the 
proportion of the population consisting of hawks) is a function of the stakes 
                                                          
 58. See, e.g., Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. 
BIOLOGY 35, 45-46 (1971) (analyzing human reciprocal altruism and how all members 
can benefit when sharing food, tools, and knowledge). 
 59. See, e.g., DAWKINS, supra note 50, at 203 (providing examples of the four 
types of outcomes possible under game theory and delineating how both players lose if 
both choose to “defect”). 
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of the contest (v) and the cost of fighting (c) and increases as the numerical 
value of v increases and decreases as the value of c increases.  The larger 
the stakes of the conflict are—that is, the higher v is in relation to c—the 
larger the probability of fighting (or the greater the proportion of hawks in 
the population).  In the alternative, the larger the cost of fighting is—the 
higher c is in relation to v—the smaller the probability of fighting (or the 
smaller the proportion of hawks in the population). In real-life terms, this 
analysis suggests that certain public policy and legal disputes are more 
likely to result in intractable war of attritions where the stakes of the 
contest are larger in relation to the costs of fighting. This analysis also 
suggests that one way of preventing such wars of attrition is by increasing 
the cost of fighting relative to the value of prevailing. 
 
24
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol18/iss3/12
